diff options
| author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2013-04-22 20:32:51 -0400 | 
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2013-04-22 20:32:51 -0400 | 
| commit | 6e0895c2ea326cc4bb11e8fa2f654628d5754c31 (patch) | |
| tree | 7089303ac11a12edc43a8c4fa1b23974e10937ea /kernel/capability.c | |
| parent | 55fbbe46e9eb3cbe6c335503f5550855a1128dce (diff) | |
| parent | 60d509fa6a9c4653a86ad830e4c4b30360b23f0e (diff) | |
| download | olio-linux-3.10-6e0895c2ea326cc4bb11e8fa2f654628d5754c31.tar.xz olio-linux-3.10-6e0895c2ea326cc4bb11e8fa2f654628d5754c31.zip  | |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Conflicts:
	drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c
	drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c
	drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmsmac/mac80211_if.c
	include/net/scm.h
	net/batman-adv/routing.c
	net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
The e{uid,gid} --> {uid,gid} credentials fix conflicted with the
cleanup in net-next to now pass cred structs around.
The be2net driver had a bug fix in 'net' that overlapped with the VLAN
interface changes by Patrick McHardy in net-next.
An IGB conflict existed because in 'net' the build_skb() support was
reverted, and in 'net-next' there was a comment style fix within that
code.
Several batman-adv conflicts were resolved by making sure that all
calls to batadv_is_my_mac() are changed to have a new bat_priv first
argument.
Eric Dumazet's TS ECR fix in TCP in 'net' conflicted with the F-RTO
rewrite in 'net-next', mostly overlapping changes.
Thanks to Stephen Rothwell and Antonio Quartulli for help with several
of these merge resolutions.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/capability.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 24 | 
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 493d9725948..f6c2ce5701e 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -393,6 +393,30 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)  EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);  /** + * file_ns_capable - Determine if the file's opener had a capability in effect + * @file:  The file we want to check + * @ns:  The usernamespace we want the capability in + * @cap: The capability to be tested for + * + * Return true if task that opened the file had a capability in effect + * when the file was opened. + * + * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not + * actually be privileged. + */ +bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) +{ +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) +		return false; + +	if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0) +		return true; + +	return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable); + +/**   * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect   * @cap: The capability to be tested for   *  |