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| author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2009-11-03 16:35:32 +1100 | 
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2009-11-10 09:33:46 +1100 | 
| commit | dd8dbf2e6880e30c00b18600c962d0cb5a03c555 (patch) | |
| tree | 24835aaf40cec5ceb2aeecccde9240ee173f70f1 | |
| parent | 6e65f92ff0d6f18580737321718d09035085a3fb (diff) | |
| download | olio-linux-3.10-dd8dbf2e6880e30c00b18600c962d0cb5a03c555.tar.xz olio-linux-3.10-dd8dbf2e6880e30c00b18600c962d0cb5a03c555.zip  | |
security: report the module name to security_module_request
For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the
module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request.
Example output:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc:  denied  { module_request } for  pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/security.h | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/kmod.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/lsm_audit.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 | 
7 files changed, 36 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h index 190c3785487..f78f83d7663 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h @@ -26,14 +26,15 @@  /* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */  struct common_audit_data { -	char    type; -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS      1 -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET     2 -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP     3 -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC     4 -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK    5 -#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY     6 -#define LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT     7 +	char type; +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS	1 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET	2 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP	3 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC	4 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK	5 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY	6 +#define LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT	7 +#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD	8  	struct task_struct *tsk;  	union 	{  		struct { @@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {  			char *key_desc;  		} key_struct;  #endif +		char *kmod_name;  	} u;  	/* this union contains LSM specific data */  	union { diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index ed0faea60b8..466cbadbd1e 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -706,6 +706,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)   * @kernel_module_request:   *	Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for   *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. + *	@kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel   *	Return 0 if successful.   * @task_setuid:   *	Check permission before setting one or more of the user identity @@ -1577,7 +1578,7 @@ struct security_operations {  	void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);  	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);  	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); -	int (*kernel_module_request)(void); +	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);  	int (*task_setuid) (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);  	int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,  				int flags); @@ -1842,7 +1843,7 @@ void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);  void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);  int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);  int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode); -int security_kernel_module_request(void); +int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);  int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);  int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,  			     int flags); @@ -2407,7 +2408,7 @@ static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred,  	return 0;  } -static inline int security_kernel_module_request(void) +static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)  {  	return 0;  } diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c index 9fcb53a11f8..25b10319036 100644 --- a/kernel/kmod.c +++ b/kernel/kmod.c @@ -80,16 +80,16 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)  #define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50	/* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */  	static int kmod_loop_msg; -	ret = security_kernel_module_request(); -	if (ret) -		return ret; -  	va_start(args, fmt);  	ret = vsnprintf(module_name, MODULE_NAME_LEN, fmt, args);  	va_end(args);  	if (ret >= MODULE_NAME_LEN)  		return -ENAMETOOLONG; +	ret = security_kernel_module_request(module_name); +	if (ret) +		return ret; +  	/* If modprobe needs a service that is in a module, we get a recursive  	 * loop.  Limit the number of running kmod threads to max_threads/2 or  	 * MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT, whichever is the smaller.  A cleaner method diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 4f3ab476937..5c700e1a4fd 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)  	return 0;  } -static int cap_kernel_module_request(void) +static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)  {  	return 0;  } diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c index 3bb90b6f1dd..51bd0fd9c9f 100644 --- a/security/lsm_audit.c +++ b/security/lsm_audit.c @@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,  		}  		break;  #endif +	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD: +		audit_log_format(ab, " kmod="); +		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, a->u.kmod_name); +		break;  	} /* switch (a->type) */  } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index aad71b2ca19..24e060be9fa 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -764,9 +764,9 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)  	return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);  } -int security_kernel_module_request(void) +int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)  { -	return security_ops->kernel_module_request(); +	return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);  }  int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a29d6612a32..c96d63ec475 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3337,9 +3337,18 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)  	return 0;  } -static int selinux_kernel_module_request(void) +static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)  { -	return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST); +	u32 sid; +	struct common_audit_data ad; + +	sid = task_sid(current); + +	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD); +	ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; + +	return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, +			    SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);  }  static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)  |